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-IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH-
BOWEN TRUCKING, INC., DALBO, INC., 
NORTHWEST CARRIERS, INC., PHILIP W. 
MARTIN AND D.E. CASADA CONSTRUCTION, 
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JAMES N. KIMBALL, Commissioners of the 
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CASE NO. 14533 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original action brought in this Court 
to review orders of the Public Service Commission of Utah in 
the matter of the application of Defendant, Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc., to acquire the operating authority of B & M 
Service, Inc., as evidenced by Contract Carrier Permit No. 
511, Case No. 6257. 
DISPOSITION BY PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
This case was originally heard by the Public 
Service Commission of Utah on the 12th day of December, 1974, 
and on the 6th day of January, 1975, the Commission issued 
Permit No. 557 restricted to service for and on behalf of 
Shell Oil Company (R. 133-134). On June 13, 1975, 178 
days after the decision of the Commission, and 159 days after 
expiration of the statutorily required filing date, applicant 
filed a Petition for Rehearing. Protestants (Plaintiffs 
herein) filed a reply and applicant and protestants filed other 
pleadings. Ultimately, on the 1st day of August, 1975, the 
Commission denied the Petition for lack of jurisdiction 
because of the failure of applicant to file said petition 
within the time required by 54-7-15 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 (as amended). On September 9, 1975, 39 days after the 
order denying the Petition for Rehearing, applicant filed a 
Motion to Reopen, to which Protestants filed a Motion to 
Strike and Memorandum in Support Thereof. Applicant then 
filed its Answer to Motion to Strike and Memorandum in 
Support of Reopening. On the 14th day of January, 1976, the 
Commission issued its order reopening the case and on the 
5th day of February, held a hearing and issued its Report and 
Order dated March 3, 1976, granting to Defendant, Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc., Contract Carrier Permit No. 557, unrestricted 
as to shipper (R. 218-220). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs seek to have the Report and Order dated 
March 3, 1976, set aside. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 18, 1974, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., 
filed an application to acquire the operating authority of B 
2. 
& M Service, Inc., (R. 110-118). That application was set 
for hearing on December 11, 1974. At the time of the 
hearing, applicant, counsel for applicant, and counsel for 
protestants entered into a stipulation that any authority 
which would be issued pursuant to that proceeding would con-
sist of a Contract Carrier Permit limited to service for 
and on behalf of Shell Oil Company. The Commission accepted 
that stipulation (R. 5-6). Based upon that stipulation, the 
protestants withdrew their opposition to the application. 
On January 6, 1975, the Public Service Commission issued its 
Report and Order in Case No. 7062, cancelling the authority 
previously held by B & M Service, Inc., and granting to Duane 
Hall Trucking, Inc., a permit in accordance with the stipu-
lation entered into on the date of the hearing. That order 
became effective January 6, 1975 (R. 134). 
On June 13, 1975, 178 days after the effective 
date of the Order, applicant filed its Petition for Re-
hearing (R. 136), protestants filed their reply to the 
document entitled, "Additional Ground for Rehearing and 
Answer to Reply11 (R. 145). On July 10, 1975, protestants 
filed a reply to said document (R. 148), and applicant 
filed an additional document entitled: "Supplemental Infor-
mation, Answering the Reply of Protestants" (R. 150). On 
the 1st day of August, 1975, the Commission entered its Order 
3. 
denying the Petition for Rehearing, and found that the 
Commission was without jurisdiction to grant applicant's 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to 54-7-15 Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953 (as amended) (R. 154). 
On September 9, 1975, 39 days after the Commis-
sion's Order denying the Petition for Rehearing, and without 
taking an appeal to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah, 
within thirty days as required by 54-7-16 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 (as amended), applicant filed its Motion to Reopen 
(R. 156). On September 17, 1975, Protestants filed their 
Motion to Strike the applicantfs Motion to Reopen and Memorandum 
in Support Thereof (R. 169), and on October 3, 1975, the appli-
cant filed its Answer to said Motion. On January 14, 1976, 
the Commission issued its Order granting the Motion to 
Reopen (R. 184). The Commission based its Order on Rule 60 
(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, stating that 
said rule is an "escape valve" to prevent inequity. On 
January 5, 1976, the Commission held a hearing and on the 
3rd day of March, 1976, issued ics Report and Order granting 
the applicant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., Contract Carrier 
Permit No. 557, as follows: 
11
 * i< -k to operate as a contract motor carrier 
transporting oil based muds in fluid form, water 
and other fluids used in the drilling of oil 
wells, and of water, oils and other fluids to be 
used or consumed in connection with oil drilling 
or producing operations upon privately owned or 
controlled property within producing fields or 
within areas being prospected by oil drilling 
4. 
operations, over irregular routes, to and from all 
points and places within the State of Utah where 
such oil drilling or producing operations are 
being carried on. The transportation authorized 
is limited to the described commodities transported 
in bulk in tank vehicles. * * * " (R. 219). 
Subsequent to that order, and on March 9, 1976, Pro-
testants timely filed their Petition for Reconsideration and 
Rehearing (R. 223). As of this date, the Commission has not 
acted upon that Order. However, pursuant to 54-7-15, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) protestants petitioned for 
Writ of Certiorari on the 29th day of March, 1976. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF JANUARY 6, 1975, WAS 
ADMINISTRATIVELY FINAL NINETEEN DAYS AFTER ITS 
EFFECTIVE DATE AND ANY ACTION BY THE COMMISSION 
SUBSEQUENT TO THAT DATE WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION. 
The Public Service Commission of Utah issued its 
initial decision in this matter on January 6, 1975. The 
Order stated that it would become effective on that date. 
Section 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) 
provides: 
" * * * No cause of action arising out of any 
order or decision of the commission shall accrue 
in any court to any corporation or person unless 
such corporation or person shall have made appli-
cation to the commission for a rehearing before 
the effective date of such order or decision, or, 
if such order or decision becomes effective prior 
to twenty days after its date, before twenty days 
after the order or decision. * * * " (Emphasis added) 
The record demonstrates that in fact no Petition 
for Reconsideration was filed before twenty days after the 
5. 
Commissions order as required by statute, and in fact, it 
was June 13, 1975, approximately five months after the 
effective date of the order, that a Petition for Recon-
sideration was filed. 
The Public Service Commission of Utah on the 1st 
day of August, 1975, issued its Order denying the Petition 
for Rehearing for lack of jurisdiction based upon 54-7-15, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended). That decision was 
correct. Pursuant to 54-7-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as 
amended), a Petition for Rehearing must be filed before the 
effective date of the Commission's order or decision and if 
the order or decision becomes effective prior to twenty 
days, said petition must be filed before twenty days after 
the order or decision. 
Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., admits that 
no written Petition for Rehearing was filed with 
the Commission prior to the petition dated June 13, 1974 
(R. 145). However, Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., 
alleges that it made verbal objections to the Commission 
staff on January 28, 1975, and that this verbal complaint 
should be treated as a Petition for Rehearing. The Order of 
the Commission was issued on the 6th day of January, 1975, 
and became effective on said date. In order for a Petition 
for Rehearing to be considered timely filed, the same must 
have been filed with the Commission not later than the 25th 
day of January, 1975, which would be the day before twenty 
6. 
days after the order or decision. In Barton Truck Line, 
Inc. vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et. a L , Case 
No. 9841 (Motion to Dismiss granted August 14, 1963), 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had before it the 
issue of the timely filing of a Petition for Reconsidera-
tion. Barton did not file its Petition for Reconsideration 
prior to twenty days after the effective date of the Order and 
the Commission denied the Petition for Reconsideration. The 
Plaintiff, Barton, filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
which was granted and filed its briefs. Defendants moved to 
dismiss the appeal because the Petition for Reconsideration 
was not filed within the time frame provided by the statutes. 
The Court, without comment, granted the motion to dismiss. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT, DUANE HALL TRUCKING, INC., TOTALLY 
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OR AVAIL 
ITSELF OF THE REMEDIES PROVIDED BY STATUTE. 
Notwithstanding its failure to timely file a Peti-
tion for Reconsideration, Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., 
had another statutory remedy which it failed to pursue in 
that it could have appealed the order denying the Petition for 
Rehearing. Section 54-7-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as 
amended) provides: 
,fWithin thirty days after the application for a 
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is 
granted, within thirty days after the rendition 
of the decision on rehearing, the applicant or 
any party to the proceeding deeming himself ag-
grieved by such order or decision rendered upon 
rehearing may apply to the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the 
lawfulness of the order or decision, or the order 
or decision on the rehearing inquired into and 
determined." 
7. 
Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. , did not 
avail itself of this remedy and did not file any Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari within thirty days after the order 
denying the Petition for Rehearing. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has uniformly 
held that failure to avail oneself of statutory remedies will 
preclude a party from asserting any further claim. Recently, 
in the case of Provo City vs. Lambert, 545 P.2d 185 (January 
7, 1976), the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had before 
it a case where Plaintiff had failed to pursue its statutory 
right of review. The Supreme Court held: 
11
 -k * -k \je have carefully considered the con-
tentions of the parties and we can only conclude 
that one who is aggrieved with the decision of 
the state engineer must comply with the provi-
sions of Sections 73-3-14 and 73-3-15 in pursuing 
a right of review. * * * The right of appeal as 
provided for in the statutes above referred to 
is the only method provided for by the legisla-
ture for a review. We are of the opinion that 
Provo City in filing its complaint more than 23 
years after the decision of the state engineer 
comes too late. * * * " 
Also, in the case of George 0. Smith, deceased and 
Lila J. Smith, widow, vs. Industrial Commission of the State, 
Weyher Construction Company and the State Insurance Fund, 
549 P.2d 499 (April 28, 1976), the Court found that failure 
to follow statutory remedies precluded plaintiff from assert-
ing any further claim. 
The Commission issued its initial order January 6, 
1975. For Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. to satisfy the juris-
8. 
dictional requirement of 54-7-15 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
(as amended), it was required to file a petition for recon-
sideration by January 25, 1975. It did not satisfy this 
requirement. In accordance with the decisions interpreting 
this provision, the order of the Public Service Commission 
was then administratively and judicially final. Defendant 
alleges that it did not know of this requirement until approx-
imately January 28, 1975. Assuming this is the first day that 
he became aware of the requirement, it was then approximately 
six months until a Petition for Rehearing was filed, which was 
denied August 1, 1975. 
On August 6, 1975, the Supreme Court of Utah issued 
its decision in Mary A. Murphy vs. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, 539 P.2d 367 (1975) clarifying the burden of proof in a 
transfer proceeding. This is the decision that Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc. relies on to support the need to reopen this pro-
ceeding. The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., and his 
counsel, Keith Sohm, knew of that decision approximately two 
weeks after its issuance (R. 182) well within the time frame 
allowed by 54-7-16 Utah Code Annotated, 1953 (as amended) to 
appeal the denial of the Petition for Rehearing. Duane Hall 
Trucking, Inc., and its counsel knew of all the facts alleged 
in its subsequent Motion to Reopen by approximately August 
20th; still it failed to avail itself of the statutory reme-
dies and waited until after the time for appeal had expired to 
attempt to reopen this matter. Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. and 
its counsel completely ignored all statutory requirements and 
yet claim in its Motion to Reopen that it was prejudiced by the 
initial decision of January 6, 1975. 
9. 
POINT III 
RULE 60 (b)(7) UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS 
NOT APPLICABLE AND THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRAR-
ILY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND CONTRARY TO FACT AND LAW 
WHEN IT REOPENED THIS PROCEEDING. 
Notwithstanding its failure to avail itself of its 
statutory remedies, on September 9, 1975, 7 months after the 
initial decision and 39 days after the denial of the Petition 
for Rehearing, applicant filed a Motion to Reopen proceedings. 
The applicant took a Shotgun1 type approach and alleged 
several reasons, among them Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The Commission in granting the Motion to Reopen 
stated: 
!,The Commission is persuaded that as a result of 
the erroneous assumption on the part of the Com-
mission and all parties concerning the status of 
the law regarding transfer of Contract Carrier 
Permits an inequity has resulted in the present 
proceeding.11 (R. 184). 
The Commission went on to state: 
"While we are not in favor or (sic) protracted 
proceedings before this Commission, particularly 
in the case such as this where we have entered our 
decision and denied a Petition for Rehearing, we 
do believe that Rule 60 (b)(7) was intended as an 
"escape valve" to prevent the type of inequity 
which would result were we to fail to reopen this * 
matter and hold a further hearing." (R. 184). 
The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc. based its 
motion to reopen on the decision in the ca^e of Mary A. Murphy 
vs. Public Service Commission of Utah, et al., 539 P.2d 367 
(1975) which it had knowledge of prior to the expiration 
of time for appeal and also on the allegation that the 
10 
Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., had not received that 
for which it had bargained. 
The latter allegation was directly refuted by 
Defendant's witness, Duane Hall. When the witness was 
questioned as to the value of the permit as restricted, he 
testified that it was worth the $40,000.00 he paid for it, 
!fas it stands now, yes." (R. 88). This demonstrates that 
the Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., had received in 
the initial order dated January 6, 1975, what he bargained 
for and expected. Where is the inequity? 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's 
application of Rule 60 (b)(7) based upon these circumstances 
is not in accord with the judicial decisions applying this 
provision. The Utah Supreme Court has held that Rule 60 (b) 
will not substitute for appeal except in very extraordinary 
circumstances. In Anderson vs. Anderson, 3 U.2d 277, 282 P.2d 
845 (1955) the Court held that Rule 60 (b)(1) authorizing the 
Court to relieve a party from final judgment does not apply 
where the notice of appeal regarding Rule 73 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure was not timely filed. The Court stated 
that the appeal was not taken in time, and that failure to do 
so is jurisdictional requiring dismissal of appeal. 
In Kettner vs. Snow, 13 U.2d 382, 375 P.2d 28 (1962) 
this Court found that Rule 60 (b) is not a device to be 
used to revive the time for taking required steps in a 
11. 
legal proceeding after the statutory time for doing so has 
elapsed. If a party could do so, the rules of procedure 
would be rendered ineffectual. 
In addition to the Utah cases there are many Fed-
eral cases interpreting Rule 60 (b) of the Federal Rules 
of Procedure which rule, in substance, is identical to Rule 
60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
A case very similar to the present proceeding is 
Annat vs. United States, 277 F.2d 554 (5th Cir. 1960). In 
that case, two land owners were sued in a condemnation 
action. Judgment was taken against both and only one 
appealed. The judgment as to the party that appealed 
was reversed and the other party moved to set aside its 
judgment based upon Rule 60, much the same as Defendant 
Duane Hall, sought to have this matter reopened because of 
the decision in Murphy vs. Public Service Commission of 
Utah, supra. The 5th Circuit in sustaining the trial court 
found the following: 
"Relief under Rule 60 (b) was properly denied. 
The judgment, insofar as it affected Mrs. Annat's 
rights was not a void judgment, nor is there any 
other valid reason justifying relief upon the 
judgment. Mrs. Annatfs counsel, as we have already 
observed, were fully cognizant of the legal ques-
tion involved in the adoption by the Court of 
Petitioner's Exhibit 1. The ruling of rhe Court 
in adopting that map as fixing locations, bound-
aries, and areas become the law of the case and 
since Mrs. Annat did not appeal, 4t remained the 
law of the case so far as she is concerned, even 
though as was determined in the Paradise Prairie 
Land case, the judgment was erroneous. However, 
12. 
it is not void and not subject to being 
vacated under Rule 60 (b)(4). The fact 
that the judgment was erroneous does not 
constitute any other reason justifying relief. 
The remedy was by appeal.If 
The Court applied the rationale of Ackermann vs. United 
States, 340 U.S. 193, 71 S. Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207, and 
stated at 277 F.2d 559: 
ffThere Ackermann and his wife, and his cousin, 
Max Keilbar, had been defendants in a denatur-
alization proceeding and judgments were entered 
cancelling their citizenship. From this judgment, 
Keilbar appealed and, on stipulation of the United 
States there was a reversal and the complaint as 
to Keilbar was dismissed. The Ackermann1s did 
not appeal. Thereafter, the Ackermann1s sought to 
vacate the judgment under Rule 60 (b). The Dis-
trict Court denied relief and this Court affirmed. 
* * * xhe Supreme Court in affirming said, "'Peti-
tioner made a considered choice not to appeal * * * " 
His choice was a risk but calculated and deliber-
ate and such as follows a free choice. Petitioner 
cannot be relieved of such a choice because hind-
sight seems to indicate to him that his decision not 
to appeal was probably wrong, considering the out-
come of the Keilbar Case * * *. There must be an 
end to litigation someday, and free, calculated 
and deliberate choices are not to be relieved from. f,f 
It is obvious from the decision of the Supreme 
Court of the United States that a subsequent decision in the 
Murphy Case may not be a basis to reopen a final judgment or 
order under Rule 60 (b). This view is further sustained in 
the case of Collins vs. the City of Wichita, Kansas, 254 F.2d 
837 (10th Cir. 1958). This case also involved a condemnation 
proceeding where one land owner appealed and others did not. 
Those that did not appeal sought to set aside the judgment 
based upon Rule 60. The Court held that: 
13. 
"Litigation must end sometime, and the fact that a 
Court may have made a mistake in the law when 
entering judgment, or that there may have been 
ajudicial change in the Court!s view of the law 
after its entry, does not justify setting it 
aside. Sunal vs. Large7~jS2 U.S. 174, 67 S.Ct. 
15S, 891 L.Ed. 1982, Simmons Co. vs. Grier Bros. 
Co. 258 U.S. 82, 42 S.Ct. 146, 66 L.Ed.457; 
Elgin National Watch Company vs. Barrett, 5th 
Circuit, 213 F. 2d 776; Berryhill vs. United 
States 6th circuit, 199 F. 2d 217, United States 
vs. Kunz, 2nd Circuit, 163 F. 2d 347?1 
(Emphasis added). 
In the case of Loucke vs. United States, 21 F.R.D. 
305 (1957), the Court considered the question of whether a 
change in the law would constitute grounds to reopen under 
Rule 60 (b). The Court found: 
flMoved by the foregoing consideration, the Courts 
have ennunciated the dual proposition that Rule 60 
(b) (6) is not a substitute for appeal and that 
resort to the Rule in order to obtain relief from 
a judgment is not justified merely because the 
judgment is erroneous or because the decisional 
law has been changed by a subsequent ruling. 
Ackermann vs. United States, 1950, 340 U.S. 193, 
71 S.Ct. 209, 95 L.Ed. 207; Elgin National Watch 
Company vs. Barrett, 5 Cir., 1954, 213 F.2d 776; 
Berryhill vs. United States, 6 Cir., 1952, 199 F. 
2d 217. ,f (Emphasis added) 
In addition, in the case of Wagner vs. United States
 % 
316 F. 2d 871 (1963), the 2nd Circuit held that: 
f![2] The catch-all clause of Rule 60 (b)(6), 
authorizing the court to relieve a party from a 
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief," 
cannot be read to encompass a claim of error for 
which appeal is the proper remedy; such a reading 
would emasculate the provisions of Rule 73(a), now 
codified in 28 U.S.C. § 2107, which strictly limit 
the time for appeal and which are reinforced by 
the last clause of Rule 77(d). Elgin National 
Watch Company vs. Barrett, 213 F.2d 776, 779-780 
(5 Cir. 1954). 
14. 
It is apparent from the cases cited that a change 
in the status of the law will not support a reopening of the 
case where available statutory remedies were not pursued. 
See also Rinieri vs. News Syndicate Company, 385 F. 2d 818 
(2nd Cir. 1967); Lubben vs. Selective Service System Local 
Board No. 27, 453 F.2d 645 (1972) and cases cited therein. 
If the Court were to adopt the Commission's view 
every contract carrier transfer proceeding prior to August 
6, 1975, the date of the Murphy decision, would be subject 
to review by the simple expedient of a Motion to Reopen 
under Rule 60 (b). It is obvious that such a situation 
would be untenable, impractical and a total violation of 
present standards of finality. 
The Motion to Reopen constituted a stray pleading, 
the filing of which was procedurally unauthorized and con-
sideration of the motion by the Commission was without 
jurisdictional basis. The Supreme Court has held that once 
it has dismissed an appeal because it has no jurisdiction 
after the time for appeal has expired that it is powerless to 
reinstate that appeal. Holbrook vs. Hodson, 24 U. 2d 120,466 
P. 2d 843 (1970). In the instant proceeding the Public Ser-
vice Commission denied the Petition for Rehearing for lack 
of jurisdiction and then, contrary to existing statutes and 
case law, reopened this proceeding. This procedure is clearly 
contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and applicable 
statutes governing the judicial review of administrative pro-
ceedings. 
15. 
CONCLUSION 
By Order, dated January 6, 1975, the Public 
Service Commission of Utah cancelled the authority held 
by B & M Service, Inc., and issued to Duane Hall Trucking, 
Inc., pursuant to stipulation, a permit to provide a trans-
portation service for and on behalf of Shell Oil Company. 
The Defendant did not petition for rehearing within the 
time allowed by statute and when it did file its petition, 
seven months after the order, it was denied for lack of 
jurisdiction. The Defendant, Duane Hall, did not attempt to 
appeal that order and after the time for appeal had expired, 
filed a Motion to Reopen. The Commission in granting that 
Motion acted arbitrarily, capriciously and without basis in 
fact or law in reopening the proceeding. In addition, the 
Commission acted arbitrarily and capriciously in expanding 
the permit issued to Duane Hall based upon the previously 
cancelled authority of B & M Service, Inc. 
The Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, Inc., and his 
counsel completely ignored all the statutory requirements 
relating to proceedings before the Public Service Commission 
of Utah. They then sought to be relieved of their decision 
to ignore the requirements by filing a Motion to Reopen. 
The Commission acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and without 
basis in law or fact in perpetuating and condoning the 
complete disregard that the Defendant, Duane Hall Trucking, 
Inc., and its counsel have shown for the statutory requirements. 
16. 
If the decision of the Commission is allowed to stand, it 
will completely emasculate the statutes and rules of the 
Commission and any application, past, present, or future, 
would be subject to the arbitrary and capricious whim of 
the Commission. The statutes were designed to bring pro-
ceedings to an end and the cases have supported that intent, 
Failure of this court to set aside the Commission's order 
of March 3, 1976, will set a precedent in this state that 
allows the Commission to completely ignore the statutes by 
which it exists. 
It is, therefore, respectfully submitted that the 
Commission's order of March 3, 1976, be set aside. 
Respectfully submitted, 
William S. Richards 
D. Michael Jorgensen 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, 
LEONARD & TATE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
1515 Walker Bank Building 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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